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I. INTRODUCTION
For many years professionals have organized associations to regulate
themselves and maintain the integrity of their profession. Although some
regulations adopted by these associations may violate their members'
civil rights, courts have been reluctant to intervene in disputes between
professional associations and their members.1 The conflict between a
member's rights and duties is a distinct problem for the legal profession.
State Supreme Courts regulate attorney conduct generally by adopting
the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR)2 which consists of ethical considerations (ECs) and disciplinary
rules (DRs). While the ECs are merely aspirational, the DRs prescribe
the minimum requirements with which an attorney must comply 3 and are
enforced by reprimand,4 suspension,5 and revocation of license to prac-
tice.6
The Code arguably contains ambiguous language, inconsistent rules,
and infringes attorneys' first amendment rights. Because severe sanctions
are imposed for violations, it has been the subject of much litigation.
Until recently, most courts have been reluctant to consider the Code's
1. See 58 GEO. L.J. 646 (1970).
2. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1975) (as amended 1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as ABA CODE]. In quoting the ABA Code, this Note omits all footnotes contained
therein.
The Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) consists of rules promulgated by the
American Bar Association to regulate attorney activity. The rules set forth uniform
standards intended to develop and maintain public confidence in the legal profession and
in the integrity of the trial process. Lawyers are held to a higher standard of conduct than
laymen and the Code emphasizes an attorney's duty to the bar rather than a member's
rights. Most state supreme courts have adopted the ABA Code with modifications. As of
1974, 47 states had adopted some part of the Code. State Bar v. Semaan, 508 S.W.2d 429,
432 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974).
3. ABA CODE, Preliminary Statement.
4. See, e.g., In re Raggio, 87 Nev. 369,372,487 P.2d 499,501 (1971) (reprimanded for
criticizing judicial decision); In re Porter, 268 Ore. 417, 425, 521 P.2d 345, 349, cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974) (reprimanded for speaking out during pending trial in
violation of gag rules).
5. See, e.g., Ohio State Bar Ass'n v. Consoldane, 0 Ohio St. 2d 337,364 N.E.2d 279
(1977) (lawyer suspended for obtaining funds from client for use in bribing a public
official); In re Troy, 43 R.I. 279, 111 A. 723 (1920) (lawyer suspended for asserting seats
on the state supreme court were bartered).
6. See, e.g., In re Moore, 110 Ariz. 312, 518 P.2d 562 (1974) (disbarment for com-
mingling and conversion of estate's funds to personal use). See generally Nurick, Perva-
sive Disciplinary Problems of the Bar-Pennsylvania's New Disciplinary System, 79
DICK.L. REv. 549 (1975).
The ABA has no enforcement powers. Action can be undertaken only through state
disciplinary committees.
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conflict with a member's constitutional rights because they believed that,
in return for their special status as members of a regulated profession,
lawyers waived certain rights.7 Some courts have disagreed, however,
concluding that lawyers enjoy the same constitutional protections as
other citizens.8 They argued that abridgment of speech would discourage
qualified people from practicing law9 and deprive society of an articulate
and intelligent critic of the administration of justice."° Recently, courts
have been more receptive to attacks on ethical restrictions in the CPR.I1
This more favorable judicial attitude together with the compelling policy
considerations suggest that both constitutional and nonconstitutional
7. We are never surprised when persons, not intimately involved with the admin-
istration of justice, speak out in anger or frustration about our work and the
manner in which we perform it and shall protect their right to so express them-
selves. A member of the bar, however, stands in a different position by reason of
his oath of office and the standards of conduct which he is sworn to uphold-
conformity with those standards has proven essential to the administration of
justice in our courts.
In re Raggio, 87 Nev. 369, 372, 487 P.2d 499, 500 (1971).
For other cases distinguishing attorneys from laymen, see, e.g., Cohen v. Hurley, 366
U.S. 117 (1961); In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959); Bradly v. Fischer, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
335 (1871); Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Va. 1976); State v.
Nelson, 210 Kan. 637, 504 P.2d 211 (1972); In re Woodward, 300 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1957)
(en banc); State ex rel. Hunter v. Crocker, 132 Neb. 214, 271 N.W. 444 (1937); Justices of
the Appellate Div. v. Erdmann, 33 N.Y.2d 559, 301 N.E.2d 426, 347 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1973)
(Burke, J., dissenting); Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928); In re Porter,
268 Ore. 417, 521 P.2d 345, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056(1974); In re Gorsuch, 76 S.D. 191,
75 N.W.2d 644 (1956); In re Simmons, 65 Wash. 2d 88, 395 P.2d 1013 (1964), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 934 (1965).
8. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); In re Oliver, 452 F.2d II (7th Cir. 1971); Chase v. Robson,
435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970); Polk v. State Bar, 374 F. Supp. 784 (N.D. Tex. 1974); Jacoby
v. State Bar, - Cal. 3d -, 562 P.2d 1326, 138 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1977); State Bar v. Semaan,
508 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974). Cf. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (attorney
may assert privilege against self incrimination in a bar proceeding). See also Pickering v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)
(public employment cases holding that one does not waive first amendment rights by
agreeing to abide by a code of conduct).
9. Polk v. State Bar, 374 F. Supp. 784 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
10. See notes 9-12 supra and accompanying text.
Lawyers, who are more completely informed about the legal system, are in a peculiarly
good position to discuss issues intelligently, act as a check on government by exposing
abuses or urging action, and criticize the judicial process. It is "largely through public
discussion that policy alternatives are articulated, and popular support is mobilized to
stimulate governmental action." Comment, Silence Orders-Preserving Political Expres-
sion by Defendants and Their Lawyers, 6 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 595, 601 (1971). See
Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 250 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427
U.S. 912 (1976); Note, Attorney Discipline and the First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv.
922 (1974); ABA CODE, EC 8-1 ("[L]awyers are especially qualified to recognize deficien-
cies in the legal system and to initiate corrective measures therein.").
11. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977) (advertising); Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (fee schedules); Chicago Council of Lawyers v.
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challenges to the Code will increase. 2 Litigation will center upon possi-
ble ethical violations of the antitrust laws, 13 and an attorney's first
amendment rights.
The Code defines attorneys' free speech rights inconsistently, ren-
dering it difficult to determine the extent to which it restricts these rights.
Several ethical considerations encourage speech: EC 8-1, for example,
acknowledges that "lawyers are especially qualified to recognize de-
ficiencies in the legal system"' 4 and invites participation "in proposing
and supporting legislation and programs to improve the system." 5 An
attorney should attempt to change a rule of law if he believes it "causes
or contributes to an unjust result."1 6 The Code further encourages attor-
neys to educate the public to recognize legal problems, 17 and to "protest
earnestly against the appointment or election of those who are unsuited
for the bench."18 Other ECs, however, discourage an attorney's freedom
to speak out. An attorney "should be temperate and dignified" because
''even minor violations of law by a lawyer may tend to lessen public
confidence in the legal profession." 2" An attorney should "be certain of
the merit of his complaint, use appropriate language, and avoid petty
criticisms, for unrestrained and intemperate statements tend to lessen
public confidence in our legal system.' '21 Disciplinary rules also discour-
Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976) (gag rules); Surety
Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va. 1977) (unau-
thorized practice of law); Consumers Union of United States v. ABA, 427 F. Supp. 506
(E.D. Va. 1976), vacated & remanded in light of Bates sub nom. Virginia State Bar v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2993 (1977) (advertising); Person v.
Association of the Bar, 414 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd, 554 F.2d 534 (2d Cir.
1977); Jacoby v. State Bar, - Cal. 3d -, 562 P.2d 1326, 138 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1977)
(solicitation and advertising).
12. See generally Bates v. State Bar, 97 S.Ct. 2691 (1977); Chicago Council of
Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Mid-
Hudson Legal Servs., Inc. v. G & U., Inc., 437 F.Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Hirschkop v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Va. 1976); Jacoby v. State Bar, - Cal. 3d -,
562 P.2d 1326, 138 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1977); Ohio State Bar Ass'n v. Ohralik, 48 Ohio St. 2d
217, 357 N.E. 1097 (1976), prob. juris. noted, 98 S.Ct. 49 (1977) (No. 76-1650). See
generally Note, supra note 10.
13. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Surety Title Ins.
Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va. 1977). Contra, Bates v.
State Bar, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977) (antitrust challenge to advertising ban rejected).
14. ABA CODE, EC 8-1.
15. Id.
16. Id., EC 8-2.
17. Id., EC 8-3, 2-2, 2-3.
18. Id., EC 8.6.
19. Id., EC 1-5.
20. Id.
21. Id., EC 8-6.
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age attorney commentary on the judicial system. Thus, a lawyer may
neither knowingly make false accusations against a judge or other ad-
judicatory officer,"'22 nor "[e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice. "23 Because of the inconsistencies in the CPR,
lawyers are uncertain about the extent of their first amendment protec-
tions. This uncertainty has a chilling effect on the exercise of this right.
This Note considers various Code provisions that conflict with attor-
neys' first amendment protections-free speech, right to know, and
freedom of association. It then reviews two attorney solicitation cases
before the Supreme Court this Term and proposes several modifications
in the solicitation rule which would effectively accommodate attorneys'
first amendment rights with the public's and legal profession's need for
protection.
II.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
A. Free Speech Protection in General
The first amendment prohibits Congress from abridging free speech,24
but fails to define speech.25 Confronted with free speech challenges,
therefore, the Supreme Court initially must determine whether the speech
is within a category protected by the first amendment.26 Although ab-
stract political discussion is almost always protected,27 libel,2 obsceni-
ty,2 9 false and misleading speech,3° and "fighting words"31 are generally
22. Id., DR 8-102(B). See also Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d
369, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1977).
23. ABA CODE, DR 1-102(A)(5).
24. U.S. CONsT. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." The first amendment applies to
the states through the fourteenth. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940); Schneider v. State, 303 U.S. 147, 160 (1939).
25. See generally Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877 (1963).
26. See Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L.
REV. 20, 28 (1975).
27. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1966); Bond v. Floyd,
385 U.S. 116 (1966); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
28. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
29. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1957).
30. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); G.F. Drew & Co. v.
FTC, 235 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1956).
31. See, e.g., Caplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Village of Skokie v.
National Socialist Party of America, 366 N.E.2d 347 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
Number 4]
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not protected.32 A state may regulate unprotected speech if the regulation
is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
If the speech is protected, however, courts balance the first amend-
ment right against governmental interests in the regulation. In early
cases, the Court required only that the state demonstrate that "the words
used [were] used in such circumstances and [were] of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substan-
tive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." 33 Courts have recently
required that the government demonstrate a "compelling,"34 "substan-
tial," 35 "important or substantial, ' 36 "significant" 37 or "overwhelm-
ing" 38 interest in the regulation.
The timing, clarity, and scope of a regulation infringing protected
speech are also considered in the balancing analysis. Regulations that
prohibit expression before it occurs-prior restraints-are presumptively
invalid39 because a flat ban on first amendment rights chills free speech
more than subsequent prosecutions do. Vague regulations affecting the
first amendment also chill the exercise of protected first amendment
rights because uncertainty about the precise boundaries of the prohibition
causes people to be cautious in their speech. n0 Finally, courts require
32. For an illustration of the categorization process, see the evolution of commercial
speech cases. The Court initially held that commercial advertising was not protected by
the first amendment in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). The concept was
eroded in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376
(1973) and Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) and finally abandoned in Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). The
Court reaffirmed protection for commercial speech in Linmark Assocs. v. Township of
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977), followed by Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
678 (1977) and Bates v. State Bar, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
33. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). See also Wood v. Georgia, 370
U.S. 375 (1962).
34. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). See also Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S.
511 (1967); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
35. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964).
36. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
37. Polk v. State Bar, 374 F. Supp. 784, 787 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
38. Hiett v. United States, 415 F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 936
(1970).
39. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402
U.S. 415 (1971); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Rodgers v. United
States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1976).
40. See generally Note, The Void-for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109
U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960). Vagueness is a due process problem because vague statutes fail
to give notice. "[W]here a vague statute 'abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First
[Vol. 1977:687
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limitations on protected speech to "be no greater than is necessary or
essential to protection of the particular government interest involved.' '41
B. Judicial Interpretations of Free Speech Under the CPR
Judicial interpretations of the CPR and constitutional challenges to it
have been inconsistent. Initially, courts ignored the constitutional at-
tack 42 or held that an attorney could not invoke his free speech right
against the state's right to discipline.43 Courts frequently cited the lay-
man-attorney distinction and noted that although laymen were protected
by the first amendment, attorneys were not. 4 Other courts have upheld
attorney free speech rights, 45 but the scope of protection afforded has
varied according to the strength of the countervailing state interest re-
quired by the court to justify the regulation. If the standard is lenient, the
regulation will probably suffer from overbreadth. 46
In Bates v. State Bar,47 the Supreme Court last Term struck down a
restriction on attorney advertising of "routine legal services,' 8 uphold-
ing the consumer's right to receive information. 49 Its practical effect was
to recognize free speech rights of attorneys to advertise.50
Amendment freedoms,' it 'operates to inhibit exercise of [those] freedoms.' "Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972). A vague statute is always overbroad; if it is
unclear, it may be applied to protected speech.
41. Note, Professional Responsibility-Trial Publicity-Speech Restrictions Must be
Narrowly Drawn, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1158, 1165 (1976).
42. See cases cited in Note, supra note 10, at 925 nn.24 & 25 (1974). Courts still often
avoid constitutional grounds when deciding ethical issues. See, e.g., Klein v. Edelstein,
407 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 551 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 98
S.Ct. 57 (1977); Hagopian v. Justices of Mass. Supreme Judicial Court, 429 F. Supp. 367
(D. Mass. 1977), affl'd, 98 S.Ct. 34 (1977); In re Mead, - Mass. -, 361 N.E.2d 403 (1977);
cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 182 (1977); Ohio State Bar Ass'n v. Ohralik, 48 Ohio St. 2d 217,357
N.E.2d 1097 (1976), prob. juris. noted, 98 S.Ct. 49 (1977) (No. 76-1650); In re Smith, -
S.C.-, 233 S.E.2d 301 (1977), prob. juris. noted, 98 S.Ct. 49 (1977) (No. 77-56).
43. See, e.g., State v. Nelson, 210 Kan. 637, 504 P.2d 211 (1972); In re Porter, 268
Or. 417, 521 P.2d 345, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974).
44. See note 7 supra.
45. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971); Chase v. Robson,
435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970); Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421 F. Supp. 1127 (E.D.
Va. 1976); Polk v. State Bar, 374 F. Supp. 784 (N.D. Tex. 1974); State Bar v. Semaan, 508
S.W.2d 429 (rex. Ct. App. 1974).
46. See, e.g., ABA CODE, DR I-102(A)(5).
47. 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977). See notes 154-79 infra.
48. Id. at 2709.
49. Id. at 2694, 2699, 2704.
50. See notes 154-79 infra and accompanying text.
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C. Areas of Conflict between Free Speech and the CPR
1. Gag Rules
Courts have been more receptive to constitutional attacks on the
Code's gag rules, which limit extrajudicial comment by counsel during
litigation, than on other CPR provisions. The present bar rules limit an
attorney's speech which is "reasonably likely to interfere with the ad-
ministration of justice' 51 from the time a criminal case is filed until the
defendant is sentenced.52 Similar proscriptions apply to civil actions53
and administrative hearings.5 4
States assert their interest in preserving a fair trial justifies the
imposition of gag rules. The rules are designed to avoid the dissemina-
tion of any news or comments that tend to prevent the judge or jury
from exercising impartial judgment.5 5 States also urge that gag rules are
necessary to preserve the integrity of the judicial process and maintain
respect for the courts.5 6 Attorneys argue, however, that they can play
a singular role in presenting the crucial issues of a case when public
interest and awareness are focused on it.57 Furthermore, they claim that
51. ABA CODE, DR 7-107(D), (E).
52. Id., DR 7-107(A)-(E).
53. Id., DR 7-107(G).
54. Id., DR 7-107(H).
55. Id., EC 7-33:
A goal of our legal system is that each party shall have his case, criminal or civil,
adjudicated by an impartial tribunal. The attainment of this goal may be defeated
by dissemination of news of comments which tend to influence judge or jury.
Such news or comments may prevent prospective jurors from being impartial at
the outset of the trial and may also interfere with the obligation of jurors to base
their verdict solely upon the evidence admitted in the trial. The release by a
lawyer of out-of-court statements regarding an anticipted or pending trial may
improperly affect the impartiality of the tribunal. For these reasons, standards for
permissible and prohibited conduct of a lawyer with respect to trial publicity have
been established.
Note the extremely broad standards EC 7-33 sets for prevention of such speech: "tend to
influence," "may ... interfere," or "may prevent."
56. See In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 624-26 (1959); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252,
270 (1941) (gag rules on press); Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421 F. Supp. 1137, 1150
(E.D. Va. 1976); Comment, supra note 10.
57. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
427 U.S. 912 (1976). See also Comment, supra note 10; Note, supra note 41.
Courts may develop different standards based on the type of trial involved: criminal,
civil, or "political." Strictest fair trial protections are afforded in criminal cases. One
commentator argues that the "fair trial" rationale does not apply to criminal "political"
trials. Comment, supra note 10, at 598. Political trials have been defined as encompassing
civil disobedience cases and conspiracy indictments. Such cases generally require more
public discussion since part of their motivation is to enlighten the public about an existing
problem. E.g., In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959) (conspiracy trial); King v. Jones, 319 F.
Supp. 653 (N.D. Ohio 1970), rev'd, 450 F.2d 478 (6th Cir. 1971), vacated & remanded with
[Vol. 1977:687
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they are entitled to the same first amendment rights afforded laymen.58
Courts recognize that gag rules regulating attorney speech must com-
ply with the first amendment and employ a balancing analysis to resolve
the conflict.59 They differ, however, over the extent of the interest a state
must demonstrate to justify the regulation. Thus, the courts in In re
Porter6° and In re Sawyer6 held gag rules permissible when the speech
tended to prevent a fair trial. 62 This overly broad and ambiguous standard
chills attorney free speech. The 1970 CPR held that gag rules were
necessary whenever the communication was "reasonably likely" to
interfere with a fair trial.63 At least one court embraced this test, 6
instructions to dispose of case as moot, 405 U.S. 911 (1972) (trial concerning Kent State
victims). The commentator contends that lawyers and defendants are the "best source of
relevant knowledge" in such a case. Comment, supra note 10, at 601. Thus, restrictions
must be narrowly drawn to further a limited legitimate governmental interest.
58. See Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); In re Oliver, 452 F.2d II1 (7th Cir. 1971); Chase v. Robson,
435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970); See note 8 supra.
59. See generally ABA PROJECT ON THE STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (REARDON REPORT), reprinted in
Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421 F.Supp. 1137, 1157 (E.D. Va. 1976).
60. 268 Or. 417, 521 P.2d 345, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974).
61. 360 U.S. 622 (1959).
62. In In re Porter, the court refused to protect an attorney's statements concerning
anticipated litigation. The attorney represented a widower whose wife died from hy-
pothermia. The attorney's statements to the media disclosed the testimony of a deposed
witness, the basis for the suit, the fact that the opposing party had sequestered a witness,
and plans for settling the case. 268 Or. at 419, 521 P.2d at 346-47. The attorney sought a
stricter standard of proof than the court required.-i.e., that the attorney had actual
knowledge of the DR and intended to violate it. Id. at 421-22, 521 P.2d at 348. In In re
Sawyer, the Supreme Court upheld an attorney's criticism of conspiracy trials while she
was representing a client on such a charge.
This standard is also consistent with the position that attorneys should be treated
differently from other citizens under the first amendment. The concurring and dissenting
opinions in In re Sawyer emphasized the difference between an attorney who belongs to a
profession with "inherited standards of propriety and honor" and a lay citizen. 360 U.S.
at 646. Justice Stewart argued that a lawyer could not "invoke the constitutional right of
free speech to immunize himself from even-handed discipline for proven unethical con-
duct." Id. The court in In re Porter held to the theory that "[w~hen one is admitted to the
bar he embraces certain ethical considerations and restrictions not required or expected of
laymen which experience has indicated will be of benefit to the public if lawyers are
required to obey them." 268 Or. 417, 425, 521 P.2d 345, 349, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056
(1974).
63. ABA CODE, DR 7-107(D), 7-107(G)(5).
64. Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Va. 1976). The court
views the rule as a reasonable regulation of the time, place, and manner of speech. Id. at
1143. See also Markfield v. Association of the Bar, 49 App. Div. 2d 516, 370 N.Y.S.2d 82
(1975).
Indeed, only where the words used present a clear and present danger, can it be
said that there is a likelihood of interference with a fair trial. In so interpretingWashington University Open Scholarship
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holding that it effectively balanced free speech rights against the fair trial
guarantee: "Can an attorney who considers himself competent enough to
try a case claim ignorance as to what comments are reasonably likely to
prejudice that case? . . .[A] lawyer knows what reasonable means just
as a priest knows what faith means. "65
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has rejected the CPR
standard. 6 In Chase v. Robson,67 the court held that speech cannot be
restricted unless it creates either a " 'clear and present danger'. . . of a
serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice" 68 or a
" 'reasonable likelihood' . . . of a serious and imminent threat to the
administration of justice.' '69 A year later, the same court concluded that
such a prohibition must be limited to situations " 'where there is a
reasonable likelihood that such dissemination will. . . prejudice the due
administration of justice.' "70
In Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer,71 the Seventh Circuit de-
clared the 1970 CPR standard unconstitutional and introduced a stricter
standard to protect attorneys' free speech rights. 72 Attorney's speech may
not be restricted unless it poses a " 'serious and imminent threat' of
interference with the fair administration of justice.' ,73 The court reasoned
that the goals of the CPR rule-to promote free speech yet retain the
subdivision (D) of DR 7-107, it is accorded its full purpose, for the attorney is
given notice of the conduct that will be punished. . .; his right to free expression
is not unreasonably limited, and the judicial process is fully protected.
Id. at 517, 370 N.Y.S.2d at 85 (citation omitted).
65. Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421 F. Supp. 1137, 1148 (E.D. Va. 1976).
66. See, e.g., Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976); In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971); Chase v. Robson,
435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970).
67. 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970).
68. Id. at 1061 (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962)).
69. Id. (quoting United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir. 1969)).
70. In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111, 114 (7th Cir. 1971) (quoting 45 F.R.D. 391,404 (1969)).
The court was there presented with a blanket prohibition against all comment which did
not consider whether such comment is or even could be prejudicial to the fair administra-
tion of justice.
71. 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976). The court there
faced the question of enforcement of a local criminal rule of the district court and the ABA
disciplinary rule proscribing extrajudicial comment by attorneys during both civil and
criminal litigation.
72. 522 F.2d at 249. The court noted that restrictions for many years are quite
possible: "the broad time span of this rule relating to civil matters is an influential factor
weighing against its constitutionality." Id. at 258.
73. Id. at 24 (quoting Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970)). For application
of the "serious and imminent threat" standard to the press and witnesses in the trial
context, see Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947);
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
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integrity of the judicial process--could be accomplished by its clearer,
more precise, and more narrowly drawn standard. The court noted the
similarities between gag orders and prior restraints on free speech. Like
prior restraints, these gag rules subjected attorneys to the possibility of
contempt proceedings and prevented speech before its expression. 74
The Supreme Court, in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,75 bal-
anced the state's sixth amendment interest in fair trials against the press'
first amendment right to report trials accurately.76 In invalidating the
press restrictions, the Court emphasized the preferred status of the first
amendment within our constitutional framework. 7" Although this analy-
sis should be employed in attorney gag rule cases,78 the Court
stated, in dicta, that gag rules imposed on defendants and their counsel
during trial were the least restrictive alternatives available. 79 Although
the Court's "unsupported and conclusory ' 80 dicta is inconsistent with
the rest of the opinion, 8 the Court subsequently refused to consider a
case that presented the issue of attorney gag rules in the fair trial
context,82 and thus implicitly allowed attorney gag rules to stand.
74. 522 F.2d at 248-49; see Note, supra note 41, at 1160-61. See also Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (describing gag rules as "an immediate and
irreversible sanction").
75. 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976).
76. Id. at 556.
77. Id. at 561. The Court emphasized that "barriers to prior restraint remain high and
the presumption against its use continues intact." Id. at 570.
78. The Supreme Court emphasized that it did not have the issue of attorney speech
before it. Id. at 564.
79. Id. at 553-54; id. at 601 n.27 (Brennan, J., concurring).
80. This aspect of the opinion is discussed in Freedman & Starwood, PriorRestraints
on Freedom of Expression by Defendants and Defense Attorneys: Ratio Decidendi v.
Obiter Dictum, 29 STAN. L. REV. 607 (1976).
81. The irony of Nebraska Press Association is that the opinions recognize so
clearly the infirmities of prior restraints against the press but suggest as a possible
"less restrictive alternative" that trial courts might impose prior restraints upon
defendants and their attorneys. Perhaps because the issue was not argued or
because the problem of prior restraints traditionally has been framed in terms of
the press rather than individuals, the Court overlooked the ready applicability of
its arguments against prior restraints to situations involving the first amendment
rights of defendants. For whatever reason, the Court appears to have adopted
Justice Stewart's distinction between the first amendment rights of individuals
and those of the press, an argument it apparently rejected in Pell v. Procunier.
Yet the adoption, if such it was, came too easily, in marked contrast to the careful
consideration given the other issues in Nebraska Press Association.
Id. at 618-19 (footnotes omitted).
82. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
427 U.S. 912 (1976). The Court had also earlier refused to hear this issue. See In re Porter,
268 Or. 417, 521 P.2d 345, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974).
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2. Attorney Criticism of the Administration of Justice
Although many attorneys desire to discuss, criticize, and thereby
improve the judicial system, several rules in the Code restrict this
activity. DR 1-102(a)(5) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice," 8 3 and DR 8-
102(B)14 and EC 8-6s5 proscribe attorney criticism of a judge or other
adjudicatory officer.8 6 States claim these rules are necessary to maintain
respect for the judicial system.
Traditionally, courts have held that an attorney cannot invoke his free
speech rights against the right to discipline.8 7 Although courts occasion-
ally upheld attorney speech rights, they often based their decisions on
non-speech grounds." In In re Sawyer,8 9 defense counsel's harsh criti-
cism of conspiracy trials was found to be general, and not improperly
directed at judge or prosecutor. 90 In State v. Nelson,91 an attorney was
not punished for stating that courts are "commonly prejudiced," police
are "headbeaters," and that he had little respect for either. The court
83. ABA CODE, DR 1-102(A)(5). The rule is both vague, because it fails to give notice,
and overbroad, because it encompasses protected speech as well as speech legitimately
subject to regulation.
EC 1-5 encourages lawyers to be "temperate and dignified . . . . Because of his
position in society, even minor violations of law by a lawyer may tend to lessen public
confidence in the legal profession." This statement within the same canon seems to
require a conservative interpretation of DR 1-102(A)(5).
84. Id., DR 8-102(B) provides: "A lawyer shall not knowingly make false accusations
against a judge or other adjudicatory officer."
85. Id., EC 8-6 provides: "While a lawyer as a citizen has a right to criticize such
officials publicly, he should be certain of the merit of his complaint, use appropriate
language, and avoid petty criticisms, for unrestrained and intemperate statements tend to
lessen public confidence in our legal system."
86. Other ethical considerations within Canon 8 seem to encourage free speech.
Nevertheless, they are often overlooked and are rarely relied on by courts in resolving
difficult factual issues. Id., EC 8-1 (lawyers "should participate in proposing and support-
ing legislation and programs to improve the system"); EC 8-2 (lawyers should seek change
in the law when it causes an unjust result); EC 8-3 (aid public to recognize legal problems);
EC 8-6 (lawyer should protest earnestly against those unsuited for the bench).
87. A lawyer cannot "invoke the constitutional right of free speech to immunize
himself from even-handed discipline for proven unethical conduct." In re Sawyer, 360
U.S, 622, 646 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring). See State v. Nelson, 210 Kan. 637, 504 P.2d
211 (1972); In re Troy, 43 R.I. 279, 111 A. 723 (1920) (two year suspension ordered
because attorney said in an election speech that Supreme Court seats were bartered);
Annot., 12 A.L.R.3d 1408 (1967).
88. See, e.g., In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959); State v. Nelson, 210 Kan. 637, 504
P.2d 211 (1972).
89. 360 U.S. 622 (1959).
90. Id. at 628 (plurality opinion).
91. 210 Kan. 637, 504 P.2d 211 (1972).
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held that "since the case was terminated, respondent's statements [could]
not serve as harassment or intimidation for the purpose of influencing a
decision in the case involved. "I
In other cases, courts have applied the attorney-layman distinction to
justify disciplining attorney statements. In In re Raggio ,93 an attorney
who publicly criticized an opinion of the state supreme court (the same
court hearing his case) was reprimanded. The court concluded that it had
become "the center of controversy" and "[e]ssential public confidence
in our system of administering justice may have been eroded.' ' 94 The
court distinguished between laymen and attorneys, noting that laymen
may criticize the performance of judges without sanction. Attorneys,
however, as members of a regulated profession, are bound by higher
standards of conduct which have "proven essential to the administration
of justice." 95
In Justices of the Appellate Division, First Department v. Erdmann,96
an attorney was quoted extensively in a Life magazine article entitled, I
Have Nothing To Do with Justice .97 He criticized trial judges for failing
to leave questions of guilt or innocence to juries. In addition, Erdmann
described appellate division judges as "whores who became madams" 98
and claimed that they obtained their positions through political patronage
or money. 99 The court refused to find such isolated instances of disre-
spect for the law subject to professional discipline. In a dissenting
opinion, Judge Burke held that no protected speech was involved, and,
relying on EC 8-6, concluded that an attorney's contentions must have
merit and must be made in appropriate language. 1°°
92. Id. at 641, 504 P.2d at 215. The court also relied on DR 8-102(B). The same court
rejected the claim that DR 1-102(A)(5) is unconstitutionally vague and has an impermis-
sible chilling effect on first amendment freedoms. Id. at 639-40, 504 P.2d at 214. The
provision was upheld again against a constitutional attack in State v. Martindale, 215 Kan.
667, 527 P.2d 703 (1974).
93. 87 Nev. 369, 487 P.2d 499 (1971).
94. Id. at 371, 487 P.2d at 500.
95. Id. at 372, 487 P.2d at 500-501.
96. 33 N.Y.2d 559, 301 N.E.2d 426, 347 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1973).
97. Id. at 560, 301 N.E.2d at 427, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 441.
98. Id., 301 N.E.2d at 427, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 442.
99. Id., 301 N.E.2d at 437, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 442.
100. Id. at 566, 301 N.E.2d at 431, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 445. See also In re Shimek, 284 So.
2d 686 (Fla. 1973) (attorney disciplined for criticizing a judge when there was likely
impairment of the administration of justice). Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42
N.Y.2d 369, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1977) indicates the greater tolerance
courts have for layman criticism. In that case, Judge Rinaldi was described as one of the
"10 worst judges in New York," "incompetent," and "probably corrupt." The court held
that a "[plaintiff may not recover from defendants for simply expressing their opinion of
Number 4]
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In two recent cases, the courts rejected the attorney-layman distinc-
tion, and squarely protected an attorney's free speech rights. In Polk v.
State Bar,'' the court held that the attorney's speech could be restricted
only when it "undermines the legitimacy of the judicial process' '-e.g.,
when jury bribery, subornation of perjury, misrepresentation to court, or
inability to represent clients competently is shown. 0 2 In State Bar v.
Semaan,103 the court held that an attorney's newspaper editorial criticiz-
ing a judge's knowledge of law and ability was protected unless the
''statement [was] made with knowledge that it [was] false or with
reckless disregard to whether it is false.'"1 4
As the CPR and judicial rules are presently written, an attorney may
not criticize the judiciary if such conduct would be "prejudicial to the
fair administration of justice."' 105 Because this standard is vague, an
attorney cannot predict whether his speech will be protected, and will
naturally limit his remarks to ensure conformity with the rules. As a
result, attorneys will less vigorously debate needed reforms in our judi-
cial system. The ABA and the judiciary must remedy this situation by
developing rules that state narrowly and precisely the state interest
justifying infringement of attorney free speech.
3. Bar Admissions
Although the CPR allows states to establish their own bar admissions
procedures, DR 1-101 declares that attorneys may be disciplined for
failure to disclose a material fact on their bar exam.1' 6 Some state
procedures arguably infringe free speech rights. In at least twenty-four
states and the District of Columbia, 17 the bar requires a candidate
statement authorizing the committee on admissions to obtain informa-
his judicial performance, no matter how unreasonable, extreme or erroneous these opin-
ions might be." Id. at -, 366 N.E.2d at 1306, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
101. 374 F. Supp. 784 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
102. Id. at 788.
103. 508 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974).
104. Id. at 432. See also In re Johnson, 467 Pa. 552, 359 A.2d 739 (1976); State v.
Kirby, 36 S.D. 189, 154 N.W. 284 (1915).
105. ABA CODE, DR 1-102(A)(5).
106. Id., DR 1-101(A) provides: "A lawyer is subject to discipline if he has made a
materially false statement in, or if he has deliberately failed to disclose a material fact
requested in connection with, his application for admission to the bar."
107. Arizona, California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennes-
see, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia. Forms were not received from seven states-Alaska,
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Maine, New Jersey, and Utah. The other seventeen states do
not ask applicants this question.
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tion regarding his moral character and fitness for the practice of law.
Fourteen states and the District of Columbia 1°8 have comprehensive
108. Delaware, District of Columbia, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and
West Virginia. The following is a typical form:
AUTHORIZATION AND RELEASE
I, .,born at
N-m city ot*o
on having filed an application for admission to the bar of Ohio,Date
consent to have an investigation made as to my moral character, professional reputation and fitness for
the practice of law and such information as may be received reported to the admitting authority. I
agree to give any further information which may be required in reference to my past record.
I also authorize and request, every person, firm, company, corporation, governmental agency, court,
association or institution having control of any documents, records and other information pertaining to
me, to furnish to The Supreme Court of Ohio any such information, including documents, records, bar
association files regarding charges or complaints filed against me, formal or informal, pending or closed,
or any other pertinent data, and to permit The Supreme Court of Ohio or any of its agents or represen-
tatives to inspect and make copies of such documents, records, and other information.
I specifically authorize The Supreme Court of Ohio to obtain any information from my official
record on file with Local Board Number___ of the Selective Service System, located in the City
of , State of ; and hereby consent
to and authorize the release of such information by the Selective Service System.
I hereby request and authorize the Department of the to furnish to The
(Aomy. Na. Afr FOm)
Supreme Court of Ohio, the record of each period of my service therein, and to furnish the character
of service rendered for each period. My serial number was
I hereby release, discharge, and exonerate The Supreme Court of Ohio, its agents and representa-
tives, bar associations and the committees thereof and their agents and representatives, The Board of
Commissioners on Character and Fitness and their agents and representatives, and any person so fur-
nishing information from any and all liability of every nature and kind arising out of the furnishing or
inspection of such documents, records, and other information or the investigations made by or on behalf
of The Supreme Court of Ohio, bar associations and the committees thereof and the Board of Commis-
sioners on Character and Fitness.
I have read the foregoing document and have answered all questions fully and frankly. The answers
are complete and true of my own knowledge.
State of
S.
County of
S19at-.o of AMlifoot
Subscribed and sworn to before me
this - day o L .D., 19-
Notofy Publ
0t t0rfd t 00,1,. o I
toga J,0. ,,mttt4 00 A tIMO to tit Ber
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release forms, authorizing every "person, firm, company, corporation,
governmental agency, court, association or institution" 109 to release
information concerning the applicant. In those states, the committee on
admissions is "release[d] and exonerate[d] from any and all liability of
every nature and kind" resulting from investigation of released mate-
rials.110 Some states even specify that an applicant is "not entitled to a
copy of the report or to know its contents."'
Since many of these forms allow access to every file kept on an
applicant, an aspiring attorney may restrict his conduct and speech for
years before he applies for bar admission to prevent the presence of any
questionable data in his file." 2 Although an applicant "consents" to bar
committee access to this information, the consent is hardly voluntary" 3
because a person may not be admitted to the bar unless his application is
complete" 4 and it is incomplete without consent to the form." 5
109. The forms generally waive all traditional privileges (e.g. attorney-client, husband-
wife, physician-patient, etc.). A few states have a special provision authorizing waiver of
the physician-patient privilege. Nevada waives it with regard to treatment in any hospital;
Arizona, which does not have one of the comprehensive authorization and release forms,
waives it regarding "physical, mental or emotional health."
110. Id. This provision means that although the bar committee might rely on errone-
ous information, the applicant could not bring a cause of action because of the waiver.
I l. Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Is-
land, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and West Virginia. Illinois' form specifies that
"if there is an adverse determination by a Character and Fitness Committee, the contents
of the report will be disclosed to me, otherwise, I will not be entitled to disclosure of such
contents and the same will be privileged." Delaware's form provides that "the contents of
any such report are privileged. . . however, [the applicant] will not be denied admission
to the Delaware bar based on a character investigation unless and until [he receives] a
hearing before the Board."
112. The forms require potential attorneys to waive privacy rights such as those
granted in the Buckley amendment. They also waive access to official files granted by any
state's "Sunshine Acts."
113. Contract principles of unconscionability are a possible basis for challenging these
forms. Clearly there is unequal bargaining power between the bar committee and the
applicant. The applicant is also deprived of any meaningful choice.
114. See note 200 infra.
115. Of the ten other states that have authorization forms, three have less comprehen-
sive authorization and release forms. They are Oregon, Michigan, and South Carolina.
See, e.g., Oregon:
I, the undersigned, being first duly sworn, on oath depose and say that I am the
applicant named in the foregoing application; that I fully realize that the determi-
nation as to whether I am admitted to practice law in Oregon depends on the truth
and completeness of my answers; that I will give any further information which
may be required concerning my past record; that the answers which I have given
are true and complete; that I hereby authorize the Supreme Court of the State of
Oregon and the Oregon State Bar, or any agent or authorized representative
thereof, to make a complete investigation of my character, financial responsibili-
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ty and general fitness to practice law in Oregon and of the completeness and
truthfulness of my answers, and I hereby release and exonerate those so au-
thorized, and any person or organization supplying requested information, from
liability of any kind resulting from the investigation or from furnishing informa-
tion; that I have read the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon
relating to admission to practice law in Oregon; and that, if admitted, I intend to
reside in the State of Oregon on and after the date of my admission to practice law
therein.
Oregon's form also includes express authorizations of credit information, driving and
motor vehicle license records, and school records. A fourth state, Virginia, limits its
exoneration clause to releases "reasonably needed by such official, body or agency in
response to his or its inquiry relating to [his/her] moral character and/or fitness to engage
in the practice of law."
The Idaho provision exonerates "said colleges and law schools from any and all liability
in connection with the contents of said files as might follow from their disclosure." The
other six states variously provide for authorization from specified institutions. See, e.g.,
the South Dakota and Missouri forms:
South Dakota
THE PERSON NAMED AS THE APPLICANT IN THE FOREGOING APPLICA-
TION AND QUESTIONNAIRE SAYS:
I am the applicant for admission to practice referred to; I have carefully read the
questions in the foregoing questionnaire and have answered them truthfully, fully and
completely, without mental reservation of any kind. I fully understand that failure to make
a full disclosure of any fact or information called for may result in the denial of my
application.
I hereby authorize educational or other institutions, my references, employers (past and
present), business and professional associates (past and present) and all governmental
agencies and instrumentalities (local, state, federal or foreign) to release to the Board of
Bar Examiners any information, files or records requested by the Board in connection
with the processing of this application.
I further authorize the Board of Bar Examiners to release to the organizations, individu-
als and groups listed above any information furnished by me or received by the Board and
material to my application.
I hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing answers and statements are
true and correct.
(Signature of Declarant)
Executed on
(Date)
Missouri
I understand and agree that the Supreme Court of Missouri, its appointees and agents of
its appointees may use all information contained herein for investigation as to my qualifi-
cation to register as a law student with the Supreme Court of Missouri and obtain
information from any public or private file or record pertaining to me for such purpose. I
understand that all such information shall be kept confidential and used solely for pur-
poses of determining my fitness to practice law in Missouri or in any other jurisdiction.
California's form recognizes the traditional privileges-i.e. attorney-client, marital,
physician-patient, psychotherapist or clergyman. At least sixteen states attempt to limit
their inquiry to the questions asked on their forms. Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut,
Hawaii, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana,
Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
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The potential attorney has an interest in protecting the right to speak
out uninhibited by fear of any professionally deleterious effects. The bar,
as a self-regulating body, has a legitimate interest in establishing mem-
bership criteria. To accommodate these competing interests, states
should require narrow, precise consent forms that limit access to relevant
information for specified purposes.' 16
4. Other Provisions Vulnerable to Free Speech Attack
a. Criticism of Another Attorney
Similar considerations of protecting attorney free speech and preserv-
ing the fair administration of justice are involved when an attorney
criticizes another attorney, yet the court standards in this area suffer from
the same problems of imprecision and vagueness. The court in State Bar
v. Semaan117 employed the following test for the regulation of such
conduct:
We recognize that such actions, where conducted in a public forum
of any nature, would usually be in poor taste, as well as unprofes-
sional, and in extreme situations could even be prejudicial to the
administration of justice. However, it cannot be said that isolated
incidents. . . raise a fact issue of professional misconduct .... 11
Courts have also recognized that DR 1-102(a)(5) 119 could be used to
regulate criticism of fellow attorneys. 120
b. Communication with a Party Opponent
An attorney may not, under DR 7-104, communicate with a party he
116. The petitioners in Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond,
401 U.S. 154 (1971) suggest a possible alternative to such close scrutiny of bar applicants.
The Court discusses the petitioners' view:
[W]hatever the facial validity of the various details of a screening system such as
New York's, there inheres in such a system so constant a threat to applicants that
Constitutional deprivations will be inevitable. The implication of this argument is
that no screening would be constitutionally permissible beyond academic exami-
nation and extremely minimal checking for serious, concrete character deficien-
cies. The principal means of policing the Bar would then be the deterrent and
punitive effects of such post-admission sanctions as contempt, disbarment, mal-
practice suits and criminal prosecutions.
Id. at 167.
117. 508 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974).
118. Id. at433.
119. ABA CODE, DR 1-102(A): "A lawyer shall not: . . . (5) Engage in conduct that is
prejudicial to the administration of justice."
120. See also Bernstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Ass'n, 139 Cal.2d 241, 293
P.2d 862 (1956) (doctor disciplined for criticizing another doctor's decision to change from
regular labor to a Caesarian section within hearing distance of the patient); Thode, The
Duty of Lawyers and Judges to Report Other Lawyers' Breach of the Standards of the
Legal Profession, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 95.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss4/6
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"knows to be represented by a lawyer."' 2' Although this rule is designed
to prevent attorneys from unduly interfering with opposing parties, 22 it
may occasionally interfere with attorney free speech rights. An attorney
may know that an opposing party is receiving inferior representation, but
in the absence of proof of incompetence' 23 or consent from the opposing
attorney he may not communicate this fact to the party. Additionally, if
an attorney proposes a settlement that opposing counsel does not
communicate to his client, the attorney may not, under the rule,
communicate this information because it may impair his ability to repre-
sent his own client with zeal. 124
c. The Confidentiality Rule
Absent specified exceptions, an attorney must preserve his client's
secrets and confidences. 11 The rule has not been challenged on first
amendment grounds. 126 The profession is apparently convinced that the
confidentiality rule facilitates the adversary system's proper operation.
Without the rule, clients might refuse to discuss their cases fully127 or
forego counsel entirely. 21 Indeed, if the rule were challenged on con-
stitutional grounds, a court might find the state's interest in ensuring
public confidence in the legal profession sufficiently compelling to jus-
tify the regulation.
121. ABA CODE, DR 7-104 Communicating With One of Adverse Interest.
122. See United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 873
1972).
123. See ABA CODE, DR 6-101(A).
124. Id., Canon 7; see id., DR 7-101.
125. See id., DR 4-101 Preservation of Confidences and Secrets of a Client.
126. In rejecting a free speech challenge to gag rules during a pending trial, Justice
Stewart in In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring), said: "I doubt that
a physician who broadcast [sic] the confidential disclosures of his patients could rely on
the constitutional right of free speech to protect him from professional discipline." Id. at
647.
127. ABA CODE, EC 4-1 provides: "A client must feel free to discuss whatever he
wishes with his lawyer and a lawyer must be equally free to obtain information beyond
that volunteered by his client. A lawyer should be fully informed in order for his client to
obtain the full advantage of our legal system."
128. The rule "not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper
representation of the client but also encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance." Id.
Cf. Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (patient may
sue insurance company for requiring doctor to divulge information in violation of the
doctor-patient privilege). There are, however, internal conflicts within the Code which are
difficult to reconcile with the confidentiality rule. See, e.g., DR 7-102(A)(2) and DR 1-
102(A)(5). (Zealous representation based on confidential information may be prejudicial to
the administration of justice.)
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I. RIGHT TO KNOW
A. Right to Know in General
Courts recently have recognized that the first amendment guarantees a
"right to know"-a right to receive information communicated by
another. 129 The right assumes that society will benefit from informed and
reliable decisionmaking 30 and that "people will perceive their own best
interest if only they are well enough informed."131
Although it is not as fully accepted as free speech, the Supreme Court
has continued to expand the right to know by striking down restrictions
129. Emerson sees the concept as embodying two notions: 1) the "right to read, to
listen, to see and to otherwise receive communications" and 2) the "right to obtain
information as a basis for transmitting ideas or facts to others." Emerson, Legal Founda-
tions of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 2. For a general discussion of the
theory, see Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245;
Comment, The Right to Receive and the Commercial Speech Doctrine: New Constitutional
Considerations, 63 GEO. L.J. 775 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Right to Receive]; Comment,
Freedom to Hear: A PoliticalJustificationforthe First Amendment, 46 WASH. L. REV. 311
(1971).
For cases that have recognized the right to know, see, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396, 408-09 (1973) (right to receive mail from prisoners); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408
U.S. 753, 762, 765 (1972) (recognized public's right to know as part of first amendment,
but right defeated by federal government's right to regulate admission of aliens into
country); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1971) (right to
peaceful distribution of informational literature is protected); Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (fairness doctrine protects right of viewers to obtain
information); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (person can read or see obscene
material in his possession at home); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965)
("State may not. . . contract the spectrum of available knowledge"); Lamont v. Post-
master General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (addressee can receive "communist political pro-
paganda" from abroad); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (right to receive
religious information); Hiett v. United States, 415 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 936 (1970) (addressee can receive foreign divorce information in the mails).
The Court has also recognized a conflicting right to be left alone. See, e.g., Lehman v.
City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) ("captive" audience has right not to be
exposed to political advertisements on city's rapid transit vehicles); Rowan v. Post Office
Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (right not to receive unwanted mail); Breard v. Alexandria, 341
U.S. 622 (1951) (door to door solicitation for commerical purposes prohibited); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (statute prohibiting street use of sound trucks emitting loud
and raucous noises upheld); Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932) (state statute
prohibiting tobacco advertisements in public places upheld); Close v. Lederle, 424 F.2d
988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 903 (1970) (right not to view paintings). See also Note,
The Constitutional Status of Commerical Expression, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 761,772-
75 (1976).
130. The right to receive fits within the theories of self government and a responsive
electorate espoused by the framers. See generally Right to Receive, supra note 129, at 777.
131. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
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on commercial speech. 132 When consumers have been granted the right
to know in cases involving legal affairs,1 33 attorneys' first amendment
protections have been enlarged by the implicit grant of power to convey
information to consumers.
In analyzing a restriction on the right to know, the Supreme Court
balances the first amendment interest against the governmental interest
in the restriction. It has become increasingly difficult to justify an
infringement of this first amendment right. Thus, although the Court in
Bigelow v. Virginia13 1 thought a "reasonable regulation that serves a
legitimate public interest" 135 was sufficient to defeat the recipient's right
to know, it required a stronger state interest when presented with a
prohibition on pharmaceutical price advertising in Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 136 In Linmark
132. See Bates v. State Bar, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977) (advertising legal services); Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (distribution of nonprescription contracep-
tives); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingsboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (for-sale signs);
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)
(prescription drug advertising). For lower court cases expanding the right to know doc-
trine in the commerical context, see, e.g., Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v.
ABA, 427 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. Va. 1976), vacated & remanded in light of Bates sub nom.
Virginia State Bar v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2993 (1977)
(consumers have right to gather, publish, and receive non-fee information about practicing
lawyers); Health Sys. Agency v. Virginia State Bd. of Medicine, 424 F. Supp. 267 (E.D.
Va. 1976) (public has right to gather, publish, and receive factual information about
practicing physicians); Terminal-Hudson Elecs., Inc. v. Department of Consumer Affairs,
407 F. Supp. 1075 (C.D. Cal. 1976), vacated for further consideration in light of Virginia
Pharmacy, 426 U.S. 916 (1976) (state law prohibiting opticians and optometrists from
advertising prices for eyeglass frames restricts consumers right to receive information);
Terry v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy, 395 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd, 426
U.S. 913 (1976) (statute prohibiting prescription drug advertising violates first amend-
ment); Right to Receive, supra note 129, at 789-94 & nn.94-118. See generally Redish, The
First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expres-
sion, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971); Note, supra note 129; Note, First Amendment
Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. CHI. L.
REV. 205 (1976).
133. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977); Consumers Union of United
States, Inc. v. ABA, 427 F. Supp. 506 (E.D. Va. 1976), vacated & remanded in light of
Bates sub nom. Virginia State Bar v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 97 S. Ct.
2993 (1977); Jacoby v. State Bar, - Cal. 3d -, 562 P.2d 1236, 138 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1977).
134. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
135. Id. at 826.
136. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). The Court upheld first amendment interests of consumers in
obtaining price information against the state interest in maintaining a high degree of
professionalism among licensed pharmacists. The Court held the state's interest could not
be achieved "by keeping the public in ignorance of the entirely lawful terms that compet-
ing pharmacists are offering." Id. at 770.
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Associates v. Township of Willingboro137 and Bates v. State Bar,138 the
Court this Term further expanded the consumer's right to obtain informa-
tion; under Linmark, only an emergency can justify repression of the
first amendment interest.139
B. Areas of Conflict Between the Right to Know and the CPR
1. Advertising
Several rules in the CPR limit an attorney's right to advertise, 40 and
thereby infringe the public's right to receive adequate information about
the availability of legal services. The justification for the prohibition
on attorney advertising in newspapers, magazines, telephone di-
rectories, on radio, and television 41 was that such action would not
only stir up litigation, but also encourage overreaching, underrepresenta-
tion, and misrepresentation. 42 This, in turn, would reduce an attorney's
self-image and status, making compliance with the ethical requirements
of the profession increasingly difficult. 143
Courts have traditionally upheld regulations prohibiting advertising' 44
137. 431 U.S. 85 (1977). The Court noted that the choice between the danger of
suppressing information and the danger arising from its free flow was precisely the choice
that the first amendment makes for us. Id. at 97 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)).
138. 97 S.Ct. 2691 (1977). The Court emphasized that "we view as dubious any
justification that is based on the benefits of public ignorance." Id. at 2704. The impor-
tance of consumer information for intelligent decisionmaking was also emphasized at
2699, 2703.
139. Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977).
140. The original 1969 ABA Code rule on advertising is contained in DR 2-101 Publicity
in General and DR 1-102 Professional Notices, Letterheads, Offices, and Law Lists. For
the earlier rule regarding advertising see ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 27
(1908) Advertising, Direct or Indirect.
141. ABA CODE, DR 2-101.
142. See Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal
Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181, 1184 (1972). See also The Effect of Legal Fees on
the Adequacy of Representation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Representation of
Citizen Interests of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 144 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings].
143. Note, supra note 142, at 1184. See also Comment, Controlling Lawyers by Bar
Associations and Courts, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 301, 334 (1970).
144. See Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424 (1963);
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S.
442 (1954); Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935); Barkin
v. Board of Optometry, 269 Cal. App. 2d 714, 75 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1969); Winberry v.
Hallihan, 361 IlI. 121, 197 N.E. 552 (1935); State v. Rones, 223 La. 839, 67 So.2d 99 (1953);
Davis v. State, 183 Md. 385, 37 A.2d 880 (1944); In re Cohen, 261 Mass. 484, 159 N.E. 495
(1928); Abelson's Inc. v. New Jersey State Bd. of Optometrists, 5 N.J. 412, 75 A.2d 867
(1950); Levine v. State Bd. of Registration & Examination in Dentistry, 121 N.J. L. 193, 1
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against attacks based on the due process and equal protection clauses. 145
Concluding that no fundamental interest was involved, courts have ap-
plied a mere rationality test, inquiring whether "any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify" the challenged legislation. 146
Regulation of the legal profession's right to disseminate information has
consistently been upheld as a valid exercise of the state's police power, 147
necessary to maintain the profession's integrity148 and the distinction
between the profession of law and a trade. 149
In response to antitrust attacks on the advertising rule, 150 the American
Bar Association (ABA), in its February 1976 meeting, revised its rule:
attorneys could list themselves in a "reputable law list, legal directory, a
directory published by a. . .bar association or the classified section of
telephone company directories." 151
The prohibition on attorney advertising, however, infringed the pub-
lic's right to know in several ways. It prevented people from being
informed so that they could recognize legal problems. Even if an indi-
vidual were aware of a problem, the advertising ban would prevent him
from intelligently choosing a lawyer who could meet his needs.152 Never-
theless, a right to know challenge of the advertising ban became possible
only after the Supreme Court struck down a similar ban on pharmacists,
emphasizing the serious constitutional infirmity of rules inhibiting com-
munication. 153
A.2d 876 (1938); Ullom v. Boehm, 392 Pa. 643, 142 A.2d 19 (1958); Modern Sys. Dentists,
Inc. v. State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 216 Wis. 190, 256 N.W. 922 (1934).
145. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Semler v. Oregon
State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
146. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). See note 144 supra.
147. See, e.g., Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424
(1963); State v. Rones, 223 La. 839, 67 So. 2d 99 (1953); Davis v. State, 183 Md. 385, 37
A.2d 880 (1944); Levine v. State Bd. of Registration & Examination in Dentistry, 121 N.J.
L. 193, 1 A.2d 876 (1938).
148. See, e.g., Mayer v. State Bar, 2 Cal. 2d 71, 74, 39 P.2d 206, 208 (1934).
149. See, e.g., In re Cohen, 261 Mass. 484, 488, 159 N.E. 495, 497 (1928). But see
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
150. See, e.g., Justice Department Charges Code Advertising Provisions Violate Feder-
al Antitrust Laws, 62 A.B.A.J. 979 (1976).
151. ABA CODE, DR 2-102(A)(6) (Feb. 1976 amendments).
152. Hearings, supra note 142, at 144 (statement of John M. Ferren); Morrison,
Institute on Advertising Within the Legal Profession, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 609, 610 (1976).
See Note, The Wisconsin Minimum Fee Schedule: A Problem of Antitrust, 1968 Wis. L.
REV. 1237, 1255. See also ABA CODE, EC 2-1, 2-2, 8-3 which encourage attorneys to
educate the public regarding their legal rights.
153. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976). For other cases striking down prohibitions on drug prices, see Florida Bd.
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The Supreme Court confronted the issue of attorney advertising last
Term in Bates v. State Bar 54 In violation of ethical restrictions,1 55
plaintiffs advertised their legal clinic in a newspaper and listed a variety
of legal services for "very reasonable fees' '-i.e., uncontested divorces,
uncontested adoptions, simple personal bankruptcies, and name
changes.156 The Court invalidated the bar rule, stating:
The constitutional issue in this case is only whether the state may
prevent the publication in a newspaper of appellants' truthful adver-
tisement concerning the availability and terms of routine legal serv-
ices. We rule simply that the flow of such information may not be
restrained, and we therefore hold the present application of the
disciplinary rule against appellants to be violative of the First
Amendment. 15 7
Emphasizing the importance of consumer information for informed de-
cisionmaking, the Court rejected the traditional rationales for the attorney
advertising ban. 5 ' It did not consider regulation of the quality of legal
of Pharmacy v. Webb's City, Inc., 219 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1969); Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Say-A-Lot, Inc., 270 Md. 103, 311 A.2d 242 (1973); Pennsylvania State Bd. of Pharma-
cy v. Pastor, 441 Pa. 186, 272 A.2d 487 (1971).
154. 97 S.Ct. 2691 (1977).
155. A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine
advertisements, radio or television announcements, display advertisements in the
city or telephone directories or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall he
authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf.
ARIZ. Sup. CT. R. 29(a), DR 2-101(B).
156. The advertisement is reproduced in the Court's opinion, see 97 S.Ct. at 2710.
157. Id. at 2709 (1977).
158. The Court discussed each of the traditional rationales for the rule and found them
inapplicable.
1) The Adverse Effect on Professionalism-The traditional argument was that an
attorney's sense of dignity and self-worth would be undermined by advertising. The Court
-refuted this argument by noting that "[i]f the commercial basis of the relationship is to be
promptly disclosed on ethical grounds, once the client is in the office, it seems inconsis-
tent to condemn the candid revelation of the same information before he arrives at that
office." Id. at 2701. The Court also stated that habit and tradition are insufficient to
sustain a constitutional challenge and rejected the characterization of lawyers as "above"
trade.
2) The Inherently Misleading Nature of Attorney Advertising-The Court
countered this argument by limiting its holding to routine legal services. The Court
rejected the argument's assumption that the public is not intelligent enough to understand
the limits of advertising.
3) The Adverse Effect on Administration of Justice-In refuting this argument, the
Court referred to the bar's obligation to aid consumers in intelligently selecting attorneys.
4) The Undesirable Economic Effects of Advertising-The Court found that the
possibilities of increased overhead and entry barriers to younger attorneys neither distin-
guished lawyers from others or had any relevance to a first amendment inquiry. The Courthttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss4/6
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services' 59 or in-person client solicitation, "10 however, and acknowl-
edged the possibility of reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions
on advertising. 161 It specifically excluded false, deceptive, and mislead-
ing advertisements from first amendment protection.1
62
The Bates decision resulted from the development of the right to know
doctrine.'63 In the past, equal protection and free speech attacks on the
advertising ban had focused on the professional rather than the consum-
er."6 The equal protection challenge was easily overcome by the
states' claim that the advertising restriction was a valid exercise of
state police power and the free speech attack was summarily dismis-
sed. 165 By focusing on the public's right to know and receive informa-
tion, the Court succeeded in rejecting the advertising ban while implicitly
granting attorneys' free speech rights. The Court, however, was able
to avoid discussion of the difficult issue of free speech rights and the
traditional distinction drawn between attorneys and laymen.
also noted that prices are often lower when a competitive marketplace is allowed to
operate.
5) Adverse Effect of Advertising on the Quality of Service-The Court found an
advertising ban does not deter poor quality work, arguing that an attorney who wishes to
do such work will do so regardless of the status of the rule on advertising
6) Difficulties of Enforcement-The Court noted that "It is at least somewhat
incongrous for the opponents of advertising to extol the virtues and altruism of the legal
profession at one point, and, at another, to assert that its members will seize the opportu-
nity to mislead and distort."
Id. at 2707.
159. Id. at 2700, 2709.
160. Id. at 2700.
161. Id. at 2709.
162. Id. at 2708.
163. Other courts have also struck down legal advertising bans on the basis of the right
to know doctrine. In Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. ABA, 427 F. Supp. 506
(E.D.Va. 1976), vacated & remanded in light of Bates sub nom. Virginia State Bar Ass'n
v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 97 S.Ct 2993 (1977), the rights of consumers
to receive and gather information for a directory of attorneys was found to be protected
activity under the first amendment. The attorney's right to submit information to such a
directory was implicitly given protection. The Court found the ethical ban overly broad
and declared it unconstitutional.
In Jacoby v. State Bar,-Cal. 3d-, 562 P.2d 1326, 138 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1977), two
attorneys cooperated with reporters who published news articles and broadcasts about
their legal clinic. The California Supreme Court found that the state bar must be furthering
a compelling state interest before it may suppress society's right to hear those views. Id.
at-, 562 P.2d at 1338, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 89. No such interest was found by the Court.
164. See notes 144-48 supra and accompanying text.
165. First amendment issues were sometimes raised but never fully considered by
courts. See, e.g., Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424
(1963); Barkin v. Board of Optometry, 269 Cal. App. 2d 714,75 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1969); In re
Cohen, 261 Mass. 484, 159 N.E. 495 (1928); Ullom v. Boehm, 392 Pa. 643, 142 A.2d 19
(1958).
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a. The Effect of Bates on Attorney Advertising
Following Bates, the ABA, at its annual August meeting, developed
two proposals for regulating attorney advertising which were distributed
to state bar associations. The ABA itself adopted a regulatory approach
to attorney advertising, modeled after those of the Food and Drug
Administration and the Securities and Exchange Commission. 166 This
proposal specifically outlines the permissible scope of an advertise-
ment.1 67 It seeks to "channel commercial announcements but would rely
on 'after the fact' enforcement"'1 6 for violations of the rule. The second
proposal is "directive;"' ' 69 rather than specify the content of advertise-
ments, it permits publication of all information that is not "false, fraudu-
lent, misleading or deceptive."70 Although both proposals suggest
166. 46 U.S.L.W. 2 (Statutes Aug. 23, 1977).
167. ABA CODE, DR 2:101 (Aug. 1977 amendment, Proposal A), 46 U.S.L.W. 5
(Statutes Aug. 23, 1977) (adopted by the House of Delegates at the 1977 ABA Conven-
tion). A lawyer is permitted to list name, address, telephone number, any legal specialties,
age, public positions held, date and place of admission to the bars of state and federal
courts, educational background and honors, publications, military service, legal teaching
positions, associational memberships, foreign language ability, bank references, and
names of clients (with their consent). Information concerning fees for an initial consulta-
tion, hourly rates, and the range of fees for specific services are permitted subject to the
general prohibition against fraudulent and misleading information. Id. at DR 2-101(B). An
attorney may not advertise additional information unless granted permission by state bar
officials. Id. at DR-2-101(C).
168. 46 U.S.L.W. 2 (Statutes Aug. 23, 1977).
169. Id.
170. ABA CODE, DR 2-101 Publicity and Advertising (Aug. 1977 amendment, Proposal
B), 46 U.S.L.W. 10-11 (Statutes Aug. 23, 1977). It sets forth the elements of fraud in great
detail:
DR-2-101 Publicity and Advertising.
(A) A lawyer shall not on behalf of himself, his partner, or associate, or any
other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, use, or participate in the use of, any
form of public communication containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, or
deceptive statement or claim.(B) Without limitation a false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive state-
ment or claim includes a statement or claim which:
(1) Contains a material misrepresentation of fact;(2) Omits to state any material fact necessary to make the statement, in the
light of all circumstances, not misleading;(3) Is intended or is likely to create an unjustified expectation;
(4) States or implies that a lawyer is a certified or recognized specialist
other than as permitted by DR 2-105;
(5) Is intended or is likely to convey the impression that the lawyer is in a
position to influence improperly any court, tribunal, or other public body or
official;(6) Relates to legal fees other than:
(a) A statement of the fee for an initial consultation;
(b) A statement of the fixed or contingent fee charged for a specific legal
service, the description of which would not be misunderstood or be decep-
tive;
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consumer education programs,171 neither allows in-person solicitation. 7 2
In addition, both prohibit television advertisements unless a state bar
association finds them necessary "to provide adequate information to
consumers of legal services."'73
Following Bates, lower courts have considered and carefully limited
the scope of the right to know. In Talsky v. Department of Registration
& Education,74 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld an advertising re-
striction that prevented a chiropractor from advertising "free chicken
(c) A statement of the range of fees for specifically described legal serv-
ices, provided there is a reasonable disclosure of all relevant variables and
considerations so that the statement would not be misunderstood or be
deceptive;
(d) A statement of specified hourly rates, provided the statement makes
clear that the total charge will vary according to the number of hours devoted
to the matter;
(e) The availability of credit arrangements; and
(f) A statement of the fees charged by a qualified legal assistance organiza-
tion in which he participates for specific legal services the description of
which would not be misunderstood or be deceptive;
or
(7) Contains a representation or implication that is likely to cause an ordi-
nary prudent person to misunderstand or be deceived or fails to contain rea-
sonable warnings or disclaimers necessary to make a representation or implica-
tion not deceptive.
171. Id., EC 2-2 (Aug. 1977 amendment, Proposals A & B), 46 U.S.L.W. 3,9 (Statutes
Aug. 23, 1977).
172. Id., DR 2-104(A) (Aug. 1977 amendment, Proposal A), 46 U.S.L.W. 7 (Statutes
Aug. 23, 1977); id., DR 2-103(A) (Aug. 1977 amendment, Proposal B), 46 U.S.L.W. 11
(Statutes Aug. 23, 1977).
173. 46 U.S.L.W. 2 (Statutes Aug. 23, 1977). Some state supreme courts have taken an
even more restrictive view of the requirements of Bates. In Missouri, rules unanimously
approved by the state supreme court would ban radio advertisements, "information on
military service, legal publications, teaching positions and memberships in legal associa-
tions." State Supreme Court Approves Stiffer Rules on Lawyers' Ads Than Bar Sug-
gested, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 19, 1977, at 3A. The Maine Bar Association also
prohibits radio and television advertising under the rationale that it is "harder to monitor
...for compliance." Legal Huckstering: Lawyers' Advertising Expected to Pick Up as
State Sets Rules, Wall Street J., Sept. 9, 1977, at 1, 23.
There is still a large philosophical split within the profession on the utility of advertising.
Compare Morrison, Institute on Advertising Within the Legal Profession-Pro, 29 OKLA.
L. REV. 609 (1976) (in support of lawyer advertising), with Jeffers, Institute on Advertising
Within the Legal Profession-Con, 29 OKLA. L. REV. 620 (1976) (opposed to lawyer
advertising). Many fear a fee war that could force lowering of rates. See Legal Huckster-
ing: Lawyers' Advertising Expected to Pick Up as State Sets Rules, supra at 1. Although
some attorneys are waiting for their states to enact new guidelines before placing their ads,
others, particularly new members of the profession seeking increased business, have
already begun advertising. Of these attorneys, some report negative reactions from their
peers.
174. -Ill. 2d -, 370 N.E.2d 173 (1977).
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and refreshments," and "free spinal X-rays" in newspapers and on city
traffic-light poles.175 The court concluded that this was not an advertise-
ment of routine services nor did it provide information helpful to the
public in making an informed decision regarding the use of professional
services.
b. Bates and the Ban Against Solicitation
Although Bates clearly held that the public has a right to receive
information in the form of advertisements about legal services, it did not
consider whether that right extends to invalidate the CPR rules that
prohibit solicitation. Whereas an attorney informs the public through
advertising that he is competent to deal with certain problems, he actively
encourages specific people with particular problems to come to him
through solicitation. Confronted with the solicitation problem, courts
have interpreted the scope of permissible attorney advertising broadly
and have narrowly limited the no-solicitation ban. 176
The ABA proposals on advertising also suggest changes in the solicita-
tion rules. Whereas the regulatory approach would make only minor
changes in the language of DR 2-103,177 the directive proposal substan-
tially changes both DR 2-103 and 104. Under the proposed rules, an
attorney cannot accept employment resulting from false information or
"coercion, duress, compulsion, intimidation, threats, unwarranted
promises of benefits, overpersuasion, overreaching, or vexatious or har-
assing conduct.' 1 78 The constitutional status of the solicitation rule
175. The chiropractor's advertisements assure the reader that "health is in reach
through chiropractic." It further states: "Chiropractic eliminates the need for
drugs which treat symptoms by eliminating the true cause of most chronic health
problems-displacement of spinal vertebrae." Some advertisements offer free
chicken and refreshments and free spinal x-rays in connectioll with the chiroprac-
tor's "open house" and picture a man on his knees praying and asking, "Why
didn't someone tell me about chiropractic care sooner?"
46 U.S.L.W. 2219 (Nov. 1, 1977).
176. The California Supreme Court in Jacoby v. State Bar, - Cal. 3d -, 562 P.2d 1326,
138 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1977), held information communicated was "not 'primarily directed'
toward solicitation unless, viewed in its entirety, it serves no discernible purpose other
than the attraction of clients." Id. at -, 562 P.2d at 1334, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
The Illinois Supreme Court similarly decided that a "tip sheet" giving legal advice and
asking clients to advise the attorneys of any changes of address was not improper
solicitation through advertising. In re Masden, - Ill. 2d -, 370 N.E. 2d 199 (1977).
177. ABA CODE, DR 2-104 (Aug. 1977 amendment, Proposal A), 46 U.S.L.W. 7
(Statutes Aug. 23, 1977).
178. Id., DR 2-104(A)(2) (Aug. 1977 amendment, Proposal B), 46 U.S.L.W. 12 (Stat-
utes Aug. 23, 1977).
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awaits a definitive Supreme Court ruling scheduled this Term. 19
2. The Right to Know's Effect on Gag Rules
Gag orders that limit attorney speech during litigation' infringe the
public's right to know when its interest in the information is greatest.
Attorneys most familiar with the particular case before the court are
prohibited from communicating their information to the public.
The theory of Bates'8' and Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart18 2
requires recognition of the right to know in gag rules. In Nebraska Press,
the Court invalidated judicial restrictions on the press during trial on the
basis of the public's right to know. Justice Brennan emphasized that
'secrecy of judicial action can only breed ignorance and distrust of
courts and judges."' 8 3 The increased exposure of the criminal justice
system through active debate, criticism, and reporting can improve the
quality of the system, as well as educate the public concerning its
operation.' 4 Because the public's need for information from interested
attorneys is at least as great as from the press, the rationale of Nebraska
Press should apply to attorneys as well.
The Seventh Circuit in Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer18 5
acknowledged the importance of the public's right to be informed." 6 The
court found gag rules in civil litigation particularly offensive because
such cases frequently continued for several years and concerned im-
portant social issues." 7 Since nonlawyers may adequately comment on
the government side, lawyers may be the "only articulate voice for [the
other] side of the case." ' 18 8 The court concluded that it "should be
179. Ohio State Bar Ass'n v. Ohralik, 48 Ohio St. 2d 217,357 N.E.2d 1097 (1976), prob.
juris. noted, 98 S.Ct. 49 (1977) (No. 76-1650); In re Smith, - S.C. -, 233 S.E.2d 301
(1977), prob. juris. noted, 98 S.Ct. 49 (1977) (No. 77-56).
180. ABA CODE, DR 7-107(A)-(H). See notes 51-82 supra and accompanying text.
181. Bates v. State Bar, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
182. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
183. Id. at 587 (Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, J.J., concurring). See also King v. Jones,
319 F. Supp. 653 (N.D. Ohio 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 450 F.2d 478 (6th Cir. 1971),
vacated & remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot, 405 U.S. 911 (1972) (injunction
restraining grand jury witnesses from speaking out about comments of special grand jury
prevented debate in public forum of social, political, and moral questions raised by the
grand jury report).
184. 427 U.S. at 587.
185. 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
186. Id. at 250. See Note, supra note 41.
187. 522 F.2d at 258. The District of Columbia Circuit has adopted a less restrictive rule
for civil litigation. For a discussion disputing the view that a looser standard should apply
for civil trials, see 29 STAN. L. REV. 1607 (1977).
188. 522 F.2d at 258. See also Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
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extremely skeptical about any rule that silences that voice." 18 9
IV. FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
A. Freedom of Association in General
Although the constitution nowhere explicitly recognized the freedom
of association, its protection is implied in the whole constitutional
framework. 190 The Supreme Court only recently acknowledged the doc-
trine by upholding the right to associate for the advancement of political
ideas in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson. 191 Courts now generally
regard this nebulous right as entitled to first amendment protection. 192 An
individual's associational rights are infringed when the government in-
hibits his ability to join together by requiring membership disclosure, 9 3
compelling association, 194 regulating the organization,19 or penalizing
an individual because of his associations.1 96 To resolve these issues,
courts balance the virtue of the organization, the legality of its activities
and goals, and the type and scope of restriction imposed. 197
B. Areas of Conflict Between Freedom of Association and the CPR
1. Bar Admissions
Applicants for bar admission are frequently required to answer ques-
tions concerning political affiliations and beliefs. 198 Although an-
189. 522 F.2d at 258.
190. For a discussion of the theory, see Emerson, Freedom of Association and Free-
dom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964); Raggi, An Independent Right to Freedom of
Association, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1977); 1970 DUKE L.J. 1181.
191. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). The right of freedom of association is generally protected
only in the context of traditional first amendment rights, although courts and commen-
tators have sometimes encouraged its recognition as an independent right.
192. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972);
United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); UMW v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n,
389 U.S. 217 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516 (1960). But see Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
193. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964); See In re Stolar, 401
U.S. 23 (1971); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
194. See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
195. United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); UMW v. Illinois State
Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia exrel. Virginia
State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
196. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Baird v. Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
197. 1970 DUKE L.J. 1181, 1200.
198. The only Code provision that deals with bar admissions is DR 1-101(A): "A
lawyer is subject to discipline if he has made a materially false statement in, or if he has
deliberately failed to disclose a material fact requested in connection with, his application
for admission to the bar."https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss4/6
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swers to such questions may indicate good moral character with which a
state may legitimately be concerned, it is an impermissible infringement
on an applicant's freedom of association to accept or reject him on the
basis of his response. Courts have provided inconsistent protection for
this right in the bar admissions context, reflecting the general uncertainty
about the scope of associational freedom. Early cases held a state that
denied an individual admission to the bar because of his affiliation with
the Communist Party or refusal to answer questions about political
associations violated due process. 199 Later, however, courts have held
that bar admission could be denied if an applicant refused to answer
questions respecting Communist Party affiliation because such political
activity was not protected by the first amendment.2° More recently, the
Supreme Court, in Law Student Civil Rights Research Council v. Wad-
mond,2°' upheld the constitutionality of bar admissions' questions con-
cerning knowing membership in the Communist Party, specific intent to
further aims of the organization, and a loyalty oath. Nevertheless, in
Baird v. Arizona202 the Court held that a state could not deny an
individual admission to the bar merely because he was a member of an
organization.2 °3
Twelve states presently require applicants to sign a loyalty oath2°4 and
at least five use the form approved in LSCRRC.2 05 Fifteen states inquire
about membership in organizations that seek to overthrow the govern-
ment by illegal or unconstitutional methods; 2°6 four of those question an
199. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Board of Bar Examin-
ers, 353 U.S. 234 (1957).
200. In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1%1); Konigsberg v. State Bar (No. 2), 366 U.S. 36
(1961).
201. 401 U.S. 154 (1971).
202. 401 U.S. 1 (1971).
203. On the same day the court decided Baird v. Arizona and Law Students Civil
Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, it decided In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971).
The Court held that an applicant may not be required to disclose all memberships in
organizations. In defiance of the Supreme Court ruling, Tennessee asks its applicants the
following questions: "List below all fraternal, social, professional, civic, political, etc.,
clubs, associations, societies, or other organizations of which you are, or have at one time
been, a member."
204. Alabama, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming.
205. Alabama, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, and Wyoming.
206. Alabama, Arkansas, California, Indiana, New Mexico, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, West Vir-
ginia, and Wisconsin. Whether these provisions can stand is dependent on how the states
construe the language.
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individual's specific intent to further the organization's aims.20 7 Two
states ask only about Communist Party affiliations. 208 Although the
states' interest in asking these questions is to ensure that members of the
legal profession will obey the law, less restrictive methods can achieve
the same result.2 °9 If a state denies an individual admission to the bar
merely because of his membership in certain organizations, it is acting
unconstitutionally under Baird v. Arizona. 210
2. Prepaid Legal Services
Prepaid legal service plans employ risk sharing and risk spreading
principles to maintain low-priced services.2 n There are two plans: in an
open panel plan, the client selects an attorney and is required to pay the
attorney's usual fees; 212 in a closed plan, on the other hand, the consumer
is provided services by designated attorneys at controlled prices. 213
Bar associations have traditionally imposed ethical restrictions on
these plans, claiming that they conflict with prohibitions against advertis-
ing and solicitation; allow third party control over the attorney-client
relationship; aid the unauthorized practice of law; and stir up litiga-
tion. 214 The CPR currently allows attorneys to participate in prepaid legal
207. Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas.
208. Idaho and Nevada.
209. This is most persuasively illustrated by the fact that 19 states and the District of
Columbia choose not to ask such questions: Arizona, Connecticut, Washington, D.C.,
Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia,
and Washington.
210. 401 U.S. 1 (1971). Other frequent questions not addressed by Baird, but which
may abridge associational rights, concern commitments to mental institutions and treat-
ment for narcotics and alcohol.
211. Note, The Organized Bar and Prepaid Legal Services-An Antitrust Analysis,
1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 1011, 1012.
212. The open panel plan, similar to prepaid medical insurance plans (e.g., Blue Cross),
accepts members' contributions to the plan. For a study of one open panel plan, see
Clifton, The Shreveport Plan for Providing Legal Services, 3 YALE REV. L. & Soc. Acr.
290 (1973). In that plan, all members contributed to the union and were offered a broad
schedule of benefits with a liberal maximum annual benefit plus a small deductible
amount.
213. The closed-panel plan pre-selects the lawyer for the member by referring him
to a particular lawyer or, at most, giving him a short list to choose from. The
organizing group, presumably having screened and approved the lawyer in ad-
vance, takes the worry and guesswork out of the selection process and provides
the member with grounds for putting his faith in the chosen attorney.
Id. at 298. Clifton contrasts the closed panel to the "free choice" given in the open panel
plan, which tends to "produce discouragement, confusion, and unsuccessful contacts."
Id.
214. In the original formulation of the CPR, the bar opposed all prepaid plans. When
[Vol. 1977:687
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services if the plan is nonprofit (unless it is an open panel plan), 215
attorneys do not use the organization to solicit clients for private prac-
tice, 216 and clients have an opportunity to select their own attorneys. 217
court decisions guaranteed organizations the fundamental right to provide legal service
plans for members, the ABA placed ethical restrictions on attorney participation in the
plans. See Note, supra note 211, at 1015. In a series of amendments in 1974, the ABA
adopted rules that approved some types of prepaid legal services. The rules clearly
favored open panel plans, which are more lucrative for attorneys but more expensive for
the consumer. Attorneys could participate in plans sponsored by bar associations, ABA
CODE, DR 2-103(D)(1)(d), or in open panel plans sponsored by "an insurance company or
other organization," DR 2-100(D)(1-4). Open panel plans could be operated for a profit
and by an organization formed solely to provide legal services. DR 2-103(D)(5)(b). How-
ever, closed panel plans could not be organized for profit or primarily to render legal
services. DR 2-103(D)(5)(a)(i). Under DR 2-104 solicitation was permitted for open panel
but not closed panel plans. An opt out provision specifying that the member may choose
any attorney to do his work was incorporated, defeating the ability of closed panel plans to
control costs by setting ceilings on fees. These ABA rules were described as "so confus-
ing, so filled with double negatives and multiple provisos and so broad in scope that there
are real dangers of bar discipline for a lawyer who enters the group legal services area."
Morrison, Bar Ethics: Barrier to the Consumer, TRIAL MAGAZINE 14 (March-April 1975).
The Justice Department thought the 1974 Houston amendments violated antitrust laws.
Note, supra note 211, at 1020. Under pressure to reconsider the rules, the ABA drafted
new amendments in 1975, which are currently in force.
215. ABA CODE, DR 2-103(D) provides:
(D) A lawyer or his partner or associate or any other lawyer affiliated with him
or his firm may be recommended, employed or paid by, or may cooperate
with, one of the following offices or organizations that promote the use of
his services or those of his partner or associate or any other lawyer af-
filiated with him or his firm if there is no interference with the exericise of
independent professional judgment in behalf of his client:
(4) Any bona fide organization that recommends, furnishes or pays for
legal services to its members or beneficiaries78 provided the following
conditions are satisfied:
(a) Such organization, including any affiliate, is so organized and
operated that no profit is derived by it from the rendition of legal
services by lawyers, and that, if the organization is organized for
profit, the legal services are not rendered by lawyers employed,
directed, supervised or selected by it except in connection with
matters where such organization bears ultimate liability of its
member or beneficiary.
216. Id., DR 2-103(D)(4)(b) & (c) provide:
(b) Neither the lawyer, nor his partner, nor associate, nor any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, nor any non-lawyer, shall
have initiated or promoted such organization for the primary
purpose of providing financial or other benefit to such lawyer,
partner, associate or affiliated lawyer.
(c) Such organization is not operated for the purpose of procuring
legal work or financial benefit for any lawyer as a private prac-
titioner outside of the legal services program of the organization.
217. Id., DR 2-103(D)(4)(e) provides:
(e) Any member or beneficiary who is entitled to have legal services
furnished or paid for by the organization may, if such member or
Washington University Open Scholarship
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This rule, which favors the open panel system, infringes an attorney's
ability to associate freely. The closed panel system, with a limited
number of staff attorneys, is most economical. When ethical rules require
the plan to offer the option of nonstaff attorneys, however, costs in-
crease, and the formation of these associations is discouraged.
The Supreme Court has recognized the right to associate for delivery
of legal services in a series of cases that involved attempts by laymen
groups to assist their members in vindicating their legal rights.2"8 In
United Transportation Union v. State Bar,2 t9 the Court held that laymen
had a right to assert their legal claims as "effectively and as economical-
ly" as practicable; the right could be abridged only by a compelling state
interest. 220 By recognizing that members have a right to engage in
collective activity to obtain meaningful access to the courts, 221 the Court
implicitly granted the right to attorneys who affiliate with these groups.
However, the Court should explicitly extend the associational right to
attorneys-and permit attorney-created groups the same opportunity to
vindicate the rights of consumers "efficiently and effectively."
3. The Rule Prohibiting Partnership with a Nonlawyer
DR 3-103 prohibits an attorney from forming a partnership with a
nonlawyer "if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the
practice of law.'"222 Yet, such a partnership in certain types of practice
beneficiary so desires, select counsel other than that furnished,
selected or approved by the organization for the particular matter
involved; and the legal service plan of such organization provides
appropriate relief for any member or beneficiary who asserts a
claim that representation by counsel furnished, selected or ap-
proved would be unethical, improper or inadequate under the
circumstances of the matter involved and the plan provides an
appropriate procedure for seeking such relief.
This proviso may require that members of a closed panel plan always have the right to
seek outside counsel. A narrower reading would permit the plan to allow outside counsel
only when the organization cannot provide contracted-for services. See Note, supra note
211, at 1021. Under Morgan's interpretation, the opt out provision allows outside counsel
if there is improper or unethical representation. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Profes-
sional Responsibility, 90 HARv. L. REV. 724 (1977).
218. United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); UMW v. Illinois State
Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia exrel. Virginia
State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
219. 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
220. Id. at 580.
221. Id. at 585. In NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), the Court recognized that
organizations have a fundamental right, protected by the first amendment freedom of
speech, assembly, and petition, to provide legal services plans for members.
222. ABA CODE, DR 3-103.
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might increase efficiency, reduce costs, and improve representation. 223
The rule has not been challenged on first amendment grounds. 224
States and the CPR maintain that this associational prohibition serves
several important interests. Lawyers, sworn to uphold certain ethical
standards, are held to a different standard than laymen. A client dealing
with a lawyer is assured that certain ethical conduct will be honored:225
the attorney-client privilege, exercising independent judgment, 226 the no-
solicitation rule, and acting in cases of divided loyalty. Partnerships in
which profits are shared with non lawyers also would encourage the
practice of law by laymen.227
Under a balancing analysis, this infringement on first amendment
rights should be struck down. Although the rule purports to prevent
incompetent legal services, it actually prohibits associations that could
improve services. The goal of competent and zealous representation is
best served by providing clients with the highest quality legal services
available; in certain cases, this may only be possible with the assistance
of a nonlawyer. Nonlawyers in a partnership would be bound by the
attorney-client privilege under an agency theory. If it is determined that
attorneys are unable to use their own independent judgment or operate
within the scope of the CPR, the partnership could then be dissolved.
V. RULE AGAINST SOLICITATION INFRINGES FREE SPEECH,
RIGHT TO KNOW, AND FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
States have traditionally prohibited attorneys from soliciting clients.228
223. For example, a lawyer specializing in family law might prefer a partnership with a
social worker to provide the best client representation. An antitrust litigator might en-
hance the quality of his service by entering into a partnership with an economist. Similar-
ly, a tax lawyer might want to enter into partnership with an accountant.
224. Previous cases have upheld various restrictions on professional partnerships. See
Crawford v. State Bar, 54 Cal. 2d 659, 355 P.2d 490, 7 Cal. Rptr. 746 (1956) (sharing profits
with nonlawyers encourages solicitation and practice of law by laymen-and lessens
attorney's independence); State v. Willson, 20 Wis. 2d 519, 123 N.W.2d 452 (1963) (can-
not share office facilities, clerical help, and other items and expenses except with another
lawyer); cf. Rockmore v. Fein, 198 Misc. 2d 1060, 99 N.Y.S.2d 409 (Sup. Ct. 1950)
(doctors may not be employees of laymen-doctors held to higher standard of conduct
than prevails in other callings).
225. ABA CODE, EC 3-3.
226. Id. The court in Crawford v. State Bar, 54 Cal. 2d 659, 335 P.2d 490, 7 Cal. Rptr.
746 (1956), feared a partnership with a nonlawyer would lessen the "independence from
the influence of a layman necessary for an attorney to carry out his responsibilities." Id.
at 665, 335 P.2d at 493, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
227. Crawford v. State Bar, 54 Cal. 2d 659, 335 P.2d 490, 7 Cal. Rptr. 746 (1956).
228. A lawyer may neither recommend nor accept employment from a nonlawyer who
has not sought his advice. Exceptions have been drawn, however, for close friends,
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Proponents of the rule claim that it avoids unnecessary litigation, misrep-
presentation or fraud, overreaching, overcharging, underrepresentation,
detriment to the legal profession, and harm to the solicited client. 229
Opponents of the ban, on the other hand, argue that attorney solicitation
will inform ignorant clients of their legal rights and encourage them to
present their valid claims to the court. In addition, aggressive solicitation
will increase competition and reduce the costs of legal services.
As a result of Bates v. State Bar,2 °3 the present status of the solicita-
tion ban is unclear. Bates approved attorney advertising, but failed to
establish a test by which advertising could be distinguished from solicita-
tion. The proposed modifications of the ABA advertising rules following
Bates disagreed over whether a new solicitation rule was required. 231 The
Supreme Court will consider the constitutionality of the solicitation ban
this Term in two quite different cases.
In In re Smith,232 the appellant attorney met with three recently
sterilized women,233 identified herself as an attorney, answered questions
about their legal rights, and explained their remedies against the physi-
cian.3 4 After learning that a Mrs. Williams wanted to bring an action
relatives, and former clients, if the advice concerns a matter similar to the previous
employment ABA CODE, DR 2-104(A)(1). Futher exceptions have been made for lawyer
referral services, legal services offices, and bona fide organizations that furnish, render or
pay for legal services to its members or beneficiaries. Id. at DR 2-103(c).
229. For a further explanation of these rationales, see Comment, A CriticalAnalysis of
Rules Against Solicitation by Lawyers, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 674 (1958); See generally Note,
Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 81
YALE L.J. 1181 (1972).
230. 97 S. Ct. 2791 (1977).
231. Compare ABA CODE, 1977 amendments, Proposal A, with Proposal B, 46
U.S.L.W. I (Statutes Aug. 23, 1977).
232. - S.C. -, 233 S.E.2d 301, prop. juris. noted, 98 S. Ct. 49 (1977) (No. 77-56).
233. Appellant states she was contacted by Mr. Gary Allen of the S. C. Council of
Human Rights to investigate the matter and meet with the woman. Appellant's Juris-
dictional Statement at 7.
Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 7 notes: "local and national newspapers report-
ed that certain pregnant mothers on welfare in Aiken County, South Carolina, most of
whom were black, were being sterilized or threatened with sterilization as a condition for
continuing to receive Medicaid assistance."
Appellee states that appellant arranged the meeting by contacting Mr. Allen and requir-
ing that he set it up. Appellee's Motion to Dismiss at 2,5. Appellee further claims that the
meeting was with those "who had been sterilized, or had been advised by their physicians
that they should undergo sterilization as a means of family planning." Id. at 2.
234. Appellant states that she simply answered questions asked by the woman. At that
time, she did not know of the ACLU's interest in the matter, nor did she advise anyone to
write to the ACLU. Appellant's Reply to Motion to Dismiss or Affirm at 5-6. Appellee
states appellant advised the women that ACLU could bring money damages against her
doctor and advised them to write to the ACLU. Appellee's Motion to Dismiss at 3.https://openschol rship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss4/6
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against her doctor,23 5 the attorney wrote a letter requesting that she be a
client for ACLU litigation.236 Mrs. Williams later declined. 237 The State
Bar Committee voted to reprimand the attorney privately for violating
DR 2-103(D) and 2-104(A); the South Carolina Supreme Court increased
the punishment to public reprimand.
In Ohio State Bar Association v. Ohralik,238 appellant attorney, after
learning of the accident of an acquaintance, 2 9 obtained consent from her
parents to visit her at the hospital eleven days after the accident.2 4" The
patient consented to his legal representation.241 Shortly thereafter, the
attorney also contacted the passenger in the car and advised her of her
legal claims . 242 After appellant recovered the full statutory amount for the
victim, the accident victim attempted to disengage the attorney.243 In a
235. Appellant claims to have received "several telephone calls" and a letter from Mr.
Allen indicating Mrs. Williams wanted to bring an action. She wrote to Mrs. Williams as a
response to these requests. Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 7. Appellee claims
appellant "was instructed by the ACLU" to get in touch with the women about the suit.
Appellee's claim appellant wrote to Mrs. Williams without having been contracted by her
in any way during the interim. Appellee's Motion to Dismiss at 3.
236. Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 25a.
237. Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement points out that "Mrs. Williams, shortly after
receiving this letter, went to Dr. Pierce's office for treatment for her child. Dr. Pierce's
attorney was present, read the letter, and questioned her about litigation against his client.
Mrs. Williams disclaimed any interest in a lawsuit, and at the attorney's direction called
appellant from Dr. Pierce's office to so inform her." Id. at 8. Appellee's Motion to
Dismiss simply mentioned that Mrs. Williams informed appellant that she was no longer
interested in the lawsuit. Id. at 4. A lawsuit was brought against Dr. Pierce in Doe v.
Pierce, No. 74-475 (D.S.C. July 25, 1975) finding for the plaintiff (one other than Mrs.
Williams). The Fourth Circuit reversed sub nom. Walker v. Pierce, 560 F.2d 609 (4th Cir.
1977).
238. 48 Ohio St. 2d 217,357 N.E.2d 1097, prob. juris, noted, 98 S.Ct. 49 (1977) (No. 76-
1650).
239. The accident occurred on February 2. Appellee's assert that appellant learned of it
on February 13 and immediately contacted her parents. Appellee's Motion to Dismiss at 5.
Appellant asserts that he learned of the accident on February 4 or 5 but did not seek to
contact any member of the family until February 13. Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement
at 6-7.
240. Appellant's assert that the accident victim's mother asked him to come by be-
cause of fear of being sued by parents of the passenger. The hospital administration had
also urged them to engage a certain law firm. Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 7.
241. There is no evidence that the client was in a mental state which would have
impaired her ability to exercise reasonable judgment, or could not intelligently and
thoughtfully consider future legal action.
242. The passenger agreed to representation. Appellee's Motion to Dismiss states she
sought to disengage his services the next day. Id. at 7. Appellant states he was not notified
of it until March 14 when she sent appellant a letter. Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement
at 8.
243. On April 12, the accident victim discharged appellant as an attorney and asked
him to submit his file to another attorney. Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement.Washington University Open Scholarship
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suit, the attorney won a settlement of one-third of the total recovery. 244
The disciplinary committee held that the attorney had violated DR 2-
103(A) and 2-104(A) by soliciting personal injury cases and recom-
mended a public reprimand; the Ohio Supreme Court suspended the
attorney indefinitely.
The two cases present several first amendment problems. The solicita-
tion ban at issue arguably infringes an attorney's free speech rights,
interferes with the public's right to know, and inhibits the associational
rights of attorneys. To resolve the first amendment claims in Smith and
Ohralik, the Court must determine the amount of first amendment
protection to which attorneys are entitled. If the Court concludes that the
lawyers must be accorded the same protection as laymen, 245 it will
balance the appellant's interest in speaking freely against the state's
interest in protecting the public and the legal profession. Because the
solicitation ban imposes a prior restraint on speech, the Court should
strike it down absent a countervailing compelling state interest.
In Smith, the appellant's right to offer free legal assistance on behalf
of an organization was infringed. Yet she engaged in no misrepresen-
tation, fraud, or harassment, and respected the client's disclaimer of
interest. The proffered ACLU services were free and competent. The
client's interest would have been adequately represented and, if success-
ful, she would have benefited from the suit. The solicitation here did not
stir up unnecessary litigation. An important constitutional right may have
been violated and the legal system, designed to redress grievances, was
being used properly. Thus, the limitation on first amendment rights here
was unnecessary to protect the public or the legal profession.246
In Virginia Pharmacy,247 the Court disapproved of "completely
suppress[ing] the dissemination of concededly truthful information about
entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information's effect upon its
disseminators and recipients. "248 The solicitation ban inhibits attorneys
and organizations from honestly advising consumers about their legal
remedies because it prohibits them from accepting employment follow-
ing such advice. Consequently, the consumers' access to the judicial
244. $4,166.66. The total recovery for the accident victim was $12,500.00.
245. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
246. The attorney in In re Smith can also claim infirmity on the grounds of vagueness.
Neither of the challenged provisions prohibit an attorney from offering services of an
organization.
247. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
248. Id. at 773.
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system and the attorneys' duty under Canon 2 of the CPR24 9 to assist the
legal profession in making counsel available are impeded. Absent a
compelling state interest, therefore, the solicitation rule must be in-
validated under Virginia Pharmacy. In Smith there is no such justifica-
tion: the consumer voluntarily attended the informational meeting; with-
out this information the welfare mother would have remained ignorant of
her legal rights; there were no charges of fraud, misrepresentation,
underrepresentation, or overcharging; and the client would have benefit-
ed from a successful lawsuit.
The solicitation ban further infringes the right of attorneys to associ-
ate freely. In Smith, the rule prohibits an attorney from cooperating with
a nonprofit organization whose primary purpose is to provide legal
services. 50 Appellant, an ACLU member, argues that under NAACP v.
Button,"' her organization has a right to assist lay persons to recognize
their legal rights and that it need not "stand by while potential litigants
forfeit through ignorance their Constitutional rights. ' ' 252 The opposing
party notes, however, that Button concerned only litigation against the
government in which no fees were involved. Smith, on the other hand,
was private litigation in which "monetary stakes" were involved. Mone-
tary stakes are viewed as increasing the likelihood of a conflict between
the aims and interests of the organizations and the client litigants."
If the Court balances the attorney's interest in freedom of association,
the organization involved, its goals, and the prior restraint imposed by
the rule, against the state's interest in protecting the public and the
profession, it must conclude that the ban is unconstitutional.
The attorney's free speech and the public's right to know are also
infringed in Ohralik. Appellant attorney contends that the first amend-
249. ABA CODE, Canon 2. See especially EC 2-1.
250. It is questionable whether appellant Smith even violated the existing rule. Id., DR
2-103 (1)(C) prevents an attorney from cooperating with a nonprofit organization whose
primary purposes include the rendition of legal services (ACLU counters that its purpose
i', to protect civil liberties, by any appropriate lawful means, just as the NAACP uses
litigation to further equal rights); such organization does not derive benefit from the
rendition of legal services by their lawyer (ACLU could have collected attorney's fees
although appellant did not represent them in the suit); the client in the case is the
beneficiary of the services and not the organization (the client would have received
monetary damages with a successful lawsuit).
251. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
252. There is no evidence that the client was in a mental state which would have
impaired her ability to exercise reasonable judgment, or could not intelligently and
thoughtfully consider future legal action.
253. Appellee's Reply Brief at 15.
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ment protects his oral solicitation of legal services absent fraud, misre-
presentation, or overreaching, and association with clients of his choos-
ing.' Here, the attorney honestly advised his potential client of her legal
rights and obtained a voluntary consent to legal representation. Yet the
spectre of "ambulance chasing" is a potentiality. Appellant visited the
client at the hospital only eleven days after an automobile accident during
a period in which the patient may have been vulnerable. Overcharging,
underrepresentation, and fraud are possible in such a situation; they were
not present in this case, however. In a balancing analysis, the Court
should recognize appellant's first amendment interest. The flat ban
against solicitation is too harsh a rule to uphold for potentially harmful
conduct. In fact, no harm against either the consumer or the profession
occurred.
A more acceptable approach would prohibit solicitation only when
consumers are "deceived or misled by over-zealous attorneys who ap-
proach them when they are particularly susceptible to duress or coer-
cion." 5 This standard would create less certainty than a flat ban and
would require a case by case analysis to determine whether an attorney
had violated the standard. The Court may wish to adopt prophylactic
rules to ensure that harm to the solicited party does not occur.2 6
In resolving In re Smith and Ohralik, the Supreme Court should
reformulate the sweeping ban on attorney solicitation and more clearly
delineate the first amendment rights of lawyers. Three alternatives are
suggested here. First, the Supreme Court may prohibit attorneys from
accepting employment that results from false information or "coercion,
duress, compulsion, intimidation, threats, unwarranted promises of ben-
efits, overpersuasion, overreaching, or vexatious or harassing con-
duct." 7 This rule strikes a balance between providing the consumer
with adequate information regarding his rights and available legal serv-
ices and protecting him from overreaching attorneys when he is most
vulnerable.
254. The Ohralik case raises an associational claim only in the sense of an individual
attorney being unable to associate with a particular client. Controlling constitutional
interpretations of the right to freedom of association weaken the argument and would
most likely not prove successful ground for resolution of his constitutional claim.
255. Brief of Amici Curiae Public Citizen and The National Resource Center for
Consumers of Legal Services at 4.
256. Such rules could require the attorney to specify the terms of his agreement and to
receive a voluntary signed consent, perhaps in the presence of a witness.
257. ABA CODE, DR 2-104(A)(2), (Aug. 1977 amendments, Proposal B) 46 U.S.L.W.
12 (Statutes Aug. 23, 1977). The Court should clearly define the terms so that an attorney
will know when he is engaging in unprotected solicitation. It may also wish to incorporate
the standards developed from case law dealing with fraud and deception.
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Secondly, the Court may prohibit or allow solicitation according to the
substance of the claim involved. 58 Thus, solicitation of suits alleging
constitutional violations might be encouraged, while solicitation of ac-
tions that might disrupt close personal relationships might be prohibited.
Such a rule, requiring a determination of desirable activity by courts and
bar associations, would be difficult to implement.
Finally, the Court may adopt the California Supreme Court's approach
in Jacoby v. State Bar.259 In Jacoby, only solicitation that, viewed in its
entirety, serves no discernible purpose other than attraction of clients is
prohibited. The court held that other solicitation was protected by the
first amendment and could not be abridged absent a compelling state
interest.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are compelling reasons to grant attorneys first amendment pro-
tections comparable to those accorded other citizens. Attorneys have the
right to speak out honestly about legal services and the legal system; the
right has often been slighted by ethical rules adopted by states. To ensure
first amendment guarantees, the profession must revise its ethical stan-
dards so that the rules are clear, precise, and narrowly drawn. If the ABA
or states fail to do so, judicial amendment of the CPR may be necessary
to conform it to the first amendment. Overregulation in debatable areas
will also decrease the authority of the bar as a self-policing organization.
Frances L. Pergericht
258. This approach is suggested in Comment, supra note 229, at 685.
259. - Cal. 3d -, 562 P.2d 1326, 138 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1977).
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